Leakage detection and tracing for databases

Authors:
Waldemar Berchtold;Marcel Schäfer;Martin Steinebach
Affiliations:
Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology SIT, Darmstadt, Germany;Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology SIT, Darmstadt, Germany;Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology SIT, Darmstadt, Germany
Venue:
Proceedings of the first ACM workshop on Information hiding and multimedia security
Year:
2013

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Abstract

This work presents a new approach for hash database individualization by blending pre-calculated dummy hashes for each user to their databases. This individualization is necessary to detect a leak after the distribution of for example Whitelists or Blacklists. The proposed code is based on collusion secure fingerprinting codes and provides resistance against intuitive attacks for databases as well as attacks for which users collaborate. Both, code generation and tracing requires minimal effort and the distributor is able to control the robustness desired. Advantages compared to salting are improved effort and leakage detection without access to the hash database. A combination of salting and the proposed approach is possible.