EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking - Special issue on wireless network security
Distributed misbehavior detection in VANETs
WCNC'09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE conference on Wireless Communications & Networking Conference
Formation coordination for self-mobile localization: framework
CIRA'09 Proceedings of the 8th IEEE international conference on Computational intelligence in robotics and automation
Beaconing support in publish-subscribe middleware for vehicular applications
Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Middleware for Pervasive Mobile and Embedded Computing
Securing location-aware services based on online/offline signatures in VANETs
ARES'11 Proceedings of the IFIP WG 8.4/8.9 international cross domain conference on Availability, reliability and security for business, enterprise and health information systems
Simulation of attacks and corresponding driver behavior in vehicular ad hoc networks with VSimRTI
Proceedings of the 4th International ICST Conference on Simulation Tools and Techniques
Central misbehavior evaluation for VANETs based on mobility data plausibility
Proceedings of the ninth ACM international workshop on Vehicular inter-networking, systems, and applications
Detection of incorrect position information using speed and time span verification in VANET
Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Security of Information and Networks
Secure localization and location verification in wireless sensor networks: a survey
The Journal of Supercomputing
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Intervehicle communication is regarded as one of the major applications of mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). Compared to MANETs, these so-called vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) have special requirements in terms of node mobility and position-dependent applications, which are well met by geographic routing protocols. Functional research on geographic routing has already reached a considerable level, whereas security aspects have been vastly neglected so far. Since position dissemination is crucial for geographic routing, forged position information has severe impact regarding both performance and security. In this work, we first analyze the problems that may arise from falsified position data. Then, in order to lessen these problems, we propose detection mechanisms that are capable of recognizing nodes cheating about their location in position beacons. In contrast to other position verification approaches, our solution does not rely on special hardware or dedicated infrastructure. Evaluation based on simulations shows that our position verification system successfully discloses nodes disseminating false positions and thereby widely prevents attacks using position cheating