Oblivious transfer and polynomial evaluation
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Efficient oblivious transfer protocols
SODA '01 Proceedings of the twelfth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Executing SQL over encrypted data in the database-service-provider model
Proceedings of the 2002 ACM SIGMOD international conference on Management of data
FOCS '95 Proceedings of the 36th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Replication is not needed: single database, computationally-private information retrieval
FOCS '97 Proceedings of the 38th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Secure untrusted data repository (SUNDR)
OSDI'04 Proceedings of the 6th conference on Symposium on Opearting Systems Design & Implementation - Volume 6
A privacy-preserving index for range queries
VLDB '04 Proceedings of the Thirtieth international conference on Very large data bases - Volume 30
Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices
Proceedings of the forty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Hey, you, get off of my cloud: exploring information leakage in third-party compute clouds
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
SPORC: group collaboration using untrusted cloud resources
OSDI'10 Proceedings of the 9th USENIX conference on Operating systems design and implementation
All your clouds are belong to us: security analysis of cloud management interfaces
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Cloud computing security workshop
Can homomorphic encryption be practical?
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Cloud computing security workshop
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
A major obstacle to using Cloud services for many enterprises is the fear that the data will be stolen. Bringing the Cloud in-house is an incomplete solution to the problem because that implies that data center personnel as well as myriad repair personnel must be trusted. An ideal security solution would be to share data among precisely the people who should see it ("my friends") and nobody else. Encryption might seem to be an easy answer. Each friend could download the data, update it perhaps, and return it to a shared untrusted repository. But such a solution permits no concurrency and therefore no real sharing. JustMyFriends ensures sharing among friends without revealing unencrypted data to anyone outside of a circle of trust. In fact, non-friends (such as system administrators) see only encrypted blobs being added to a persistent store. JustMyFriends allows data sharing and full transactions. It supports the use of all SQL including stored procedures, updates, and arbitrary queries. Additionally, it provides full access privacy, preventing the host from discovering patterns or correlations in the user's data access behavior. The demonstration will show how friends in an unnamed government agency can coordinate the management of a spy network in a transactional fashion. Demo visitors will be able to play the roles of station chiefs and/or of troublemakers. As station chiefs, they will write their own transactions and queries, logout, login. As troublemakers, visitors will be able to play the role of a curious observer, kill client processes, and in general try to disrupt the system.