One-way trapdoor permutations are sufficient for non-trivial single-server private information retrieval

  • Authors:
  • Eyal Kushilevitz;Rafail Ostrovsky

  • Affiliations:
  • IBM T.J. Watson Research Center, New-York and Computer Science Department, Technion, Haifa, Israel;Telcordia Technologies Inc., Morristown, New Jersey

  • Venue:
  • EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
  • Year:
  • 2000

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.00

Visualization

Abstract

We show that general one-way trapdoor permutations are sufficient to privately retrieve an entry from a database of size n with total communication complexity strictly less than n. More specifically, we present a protocol in which the user sends O(K2) bits and the server sends n - cn/K bits (for any constant c), where K is the security parameter of the trapdoor permutations. Thus, for sufficiently large databases (e.g., when K = nƐ for some small Ɛ) our construction breaks the information-theoretic lower-bound (of at least n bits). This demonstrates the feasibility of basing single-server private information retrieval on general complexity assumptions. An important implication of our result is that we can implement a 1-out-of- n Oblivious Transfer protocol with communication complexity strictly less than n based on any one-way trapdoor permutation.