Interactive hashing simplifies zero-knowledge protocol design

  • Authors:
  • Rafail Ostrovsky;Ramarathnam Venkatesan;Moti Yung

  • Affiliations:
  • Unive of California at Berkely;Bellcore, Morristown, NJ;IBM Research, T.J. Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights, NY

  • Venue:
  • EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
  • Year:
  • 1994

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Abstract

Often the core difficulty in designing zero-knowledge protocols arises from having to consider every possible cheating verifier trying to extract additional information. We here consider a compiler which transforms protocols proven secure only with respect to the honest verifier into protocols which are secure against any (even cheating) verifier. Such a compiler, which preserves the zero-knowledge property of a statistically or computationally secure protocol was first proposed in [BMO] based on Discrte Logarithm problem. In this paper, we show how such a compiler could be constructed based on any one-way permutation using our recent method of interactive hashing [OVY-90, NOVY]. This applies to both statistically and computationally secure protocols, preserving their respective security. Our result allows us to utilize DES-like permutations for such a compiler.