Honest Verifier vs Dishonest Verifier in Public Cain Zero-Knowledge Proofs

  • Authors:
  • Ivan Damgård;Oded Goldreich;Tatsuaki Okamoto;Avi Wigderson

  • Affiliations:
  • -;-;-;-

  • Venue:
  • CRYPTO '95 Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
  • Year:
  • 1995

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Abstract

This paper presents two transformations of public-coin/Arthur-Merlin proof systems which are zero-knowledge with respect to the honest verifier into (public-coin/Arthur-Merlin) proof systems which are zero-knowledge with respect to any verifier.The first transformation applies only to constant-round proof systems. It builds on Damg氓rd's transformation (see Crypto93), using ordinary hashing functions instead of the interactive hashing protocol (of Naor, Ostrovsky, Venkatesan and Yung - see Crypto92) which was used by Damg氓rd. Consequently, the protocols resulting from our transformation have much lower round-complexity than those derived by Damg氓rd's transformation. As in Damg氓rd's transformation, our transformation preserves statistical/perfect zero-knowledge and does not rely on any computational assumptions. However, unlike Damg氓rd's transformation, the new transformation is not applicable to argument systems or to proofs of knowledge.The second transformation can be applied to proof systems of arbitrary number of rounds, but it only preserves statistical zero-knowledge. It assumes the existence of secure commitment schemes and transforms any public-coin proof which is statistical zero-knowledge with respect to the honest into one which is statistical zero-knowledge (in general). It follows, by a result of Ostrovsky and Wigderson (1993), that any language which is "hard on the average" and has a public-coin proof system which is statistical zero-knowledge with respect to the honest verifier, has a proof system which is statistical zero-knowledge (with respect to any verifier).