On the complexity of the parity argument and other inefficient proofs of existence
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue: 31st IEEE conference on foundations of computer science, Oct. 22–24, 1990
Smoothed analysis of algorithms: Why the simplex algorithm usually takes polynomial time
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Exponentially Many Steps for Finding a Nash Equilibrium in a Bimatrix Game
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Computing an Arrow-Debreu Market Equilibrium for Linear Utilities
SIAM Journal on Computing
Market equilibrium via a primal--dual algorithm for a convex program
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Market Equilibria in Polynomial Time for Fixed Number of Goods or Agents
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Settling the complexity of computing two-player Nash equilibria
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
ISAAC '09 Proceedings of the 20th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation
Settling the Complexity of Arrow-Debreu Equilibria in Markets with Additively Separable Utilities
FOCS '09 Proceedings of the 2009 50th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria and Other Fixed Points
SIAM Journal on Computing
Market equilibrium under separable, piecewise-linear, concave utilities
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
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Using the powerful machinery of the linear complementarity problem and Lemke's algorithm, we give a practical algorithm for computing an equilibrium for Arrow-Debreu markets under separable, piecewise-linear concave (SPLC) utilities, despite the PPAD-completeness of this case. As a corollary, we obtain the first elementary proof of existence of equilibrium for this case, i.e., without using fixed point theorems. In 1975, Eaves [10] had given such an algorithm for the case of linear utilities and had asked for an extension to the piecewise-linear, concave utilities. Our result settles the relevant subcase of his problem as well as the problem of Vazirani and Yannakakis of obtaining a path following algorithm for SPLC markets, thereby giving a direct proof of membership of this case in PPAD. We also prove that SPLC markets have an odd number of equilibria (up to scaling), hence matching the classical result of Shapley about 2-Nash equilibria [24], which was based on the Lemke-Howson algorithm. For the linear case, Eaves had asked for a combinatorial interpretation of his algorithm. We provide this and it yields a particularly simple proof of the fact that the set of equilibrium prices is convex.