Settling the Complexity of Arrow-Debreu Equilibria in Markets with Additively Separable Utilities

Authors:
Xi Chen;Decheng Dai;Ye Du;Shang-Hua Teng
Affiliations:
-;-;-;-
Venue:
FOCS '09 Proceedings of the 2009 50th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Year:
2009

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Abstract

We prove that the problem of computing an Arrow-Debreu market equilibrium is PPAD-complete even when all traders use additively separable, piecewise-linear and concave utility functions. In fact, our proof shows that this market-equilibrium problem does not have a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme, unless every problem in PPAD is solvable in polynomial time.