Algorithmic Game Theory
Settling the complexity of computing two-player Nash equilibria
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
The Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium
SIAM Journal on Computing
Settling the Complexity of Arrow-Debreu Equilibria in Markets with Additively Separable Utilities
FOCS '09 Proceedings of the 2009 50th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria and Other Fixed Points
SIAM Journal on Computing
The empirical implications of rank in Bimatrix games
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Recent results in complexity theory suggest that various economic theories require agents to solve intractable problems. However, such results assume the agents are optimizing explicit utility functions, whereas the economic theories merely assume the agents' behavior is rationalizable by the optimization of some utility function. For a major economic theory, the theory of the consumer, we show that behaving in a rationalizable way is easier than the corresponding optimization problem. Specifically, if an agent's behavior is at all rationalizable, then it is rationalizable using a utility function that is easy to maximize in every budget set.