A linear lower bound on the unbounded error probabilistic communication complexity
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Complexity 2001
Algorithmic Game Theory
Settling the complexity of computing two-player Nash equilibria
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
The Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium
SIAM Journal on Computing
On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria and Other Fixed Points
SIAM Journal on Computing
Complexity and economics: computational constraints may not matter empirically
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
A revealed preference approach to computational complexity in economics
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Survey: Nash equilibria: Complexity, symmetries, and approximation
Computer Science Review
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We study the structural complexity of bimatrix games, formalized via rank, from an empirical perspective. We consider a setting where we have data on player behavior in diverse strategic situations, but where we do not observe the relevant payoff functions. We prove that high complexity (high rank) has empirical consequences when arbitrary data is considered. Additionally, we prove that, in more restrictive classes of data (termed laminar), any observation is rationalizable using a low-rank game: specifically a zero-sum game. Hence complexity as a structural property of a game is not always testable. Finally, we prove a general result connecting the structure of the feasible data sets with the highest rank that may be needed to rationalize a set of observations.