A threshold of ln n for approximating set cover
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Convex Optimization
On profit-maximizing envy-free pricing
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Learning from revealed preference
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A path to the Arrow–Debreu competitive market equilibrium
Mathematical Programming: Series A and B
Algorithmic Game Theory
Ruling Out PTAS for Graph Min-Bisection, Dense k-Subgraph, and Bipartite Clique
SIAM Journal on Computing
A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Computing an Arrow-Debreu Market Equilibrium for Linear Utilities
SIAM Journal on Computing
Settling the complexity of computing two-player Nash equilibria
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
The Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium
SIAM Journal on Computing
Settling the Complexity of Arrow-Debreu Equilibria in Markets with Additively Separable Utilities
FOCS '09 Proceedings of the 2009 50th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria and Other Fixed Points
SIAM Journal on Computing
Survey: Nash equilibria: Complexity, symmetries, and approximation
Computer Science Review
Tatonnement in ongoing markets of complementary goods
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Efficiently learning from revealed preference
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
The empirical implications of rank in Bimatrix games
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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Recent results in complexity theory suggest that various economic theories require agents to solve computationally intractable problems. However, such results assume the agents are optimizing explicit utility functions, whereas the economic theories merely assume the agents behave rationally, where rational behavior is defined via some optimization problem. Might making rational choices be easier than solving the corresponding optimization problem? For at least one major economic theory, the theory of the consumer (which simply postulates that consumers are utility maximizing), we find this is indeed the case. In other words, we prove the possibly surprising result that computational constraints have no empirical consequences for consumer choice theory. Our result motivates a general approach for posing questions about the empirical content of computational constraints: the revealed preference approach to computational complexity. This approach complements the conventional worst-case view of computational complexity in important ways, and is methodologically close to mainstream economics.