Software piracy: an analysis of protection strategies
Management Science
Information Goods Pricing and Copyright Enforcement: Welfare Analysis
Information Systems Research
Nonlinear Pricing of Information Goods
Management Science
Preventive and deterrent controls for software piracy
Journal of Management Information Systems
Network Software Security and User Incentives
Management Science
Information Systems Research
Information Goods and Vertical Differentiation
Journal of Management Information Systems
Impact of piracy on innovation at software firms and implications for piracy policy
Decision Support Systems
Optimal Policy for Software Vulnerability Disclosure
Management Science
Research Note---When Is Versioning Optimal for Information Goods?
Management Science
Versioning and Piracy Control for Digital Information Goods
Operations Research
Adoption of Information Technology Under Network Effects
Information Systems Research
Let the Pirates Patch? An Economic Analysis of Software Security Patch Restrictions
Information Systems Research
Digital Piracy: A Competitive Analysis
Marketing Science
Information Goods vs. Industrial Goods: Cost Structure and Competition
Management Science
Effects of Piracy on Quality of Information Goods
Management Science
Hacker Behavior, Network Effects, and the Security Software Market
Journal of Management Information Systems
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Motivated by the recent strategy switch of a large software producer, this paper revisits the trade-offs associated with tolerating illegal distribution of software products. Conventional wisdom is that a higher level of positive network effects justifies a tolerant approach on the part of software producers-because illegal distribution leads to more users, amplifies positive network effects, and creates a greater demand for the legal version. I show that this wisdom does not hold in the context of supporting illegal versions with patches. Patches are used for plugging security vulnerabilities as well as for distributing functionality changes. Software producers have the option of supporting illegal versions with either or both kinds of patches. I find that, even in the presence of strong positive network effects, the least tolerant approach of denying illegal versions both kinds of patches can be optimal.