Formal verification of authentication-type properties of an electronic voting protocol using mCRL2

Authors:
Hamid Reza Mahrooghi;Mohammad Hashem Haghighat;Rasool Jalili
Affiliations:
Network Security Center, Department of Computer Engineering, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran;Network Security Center, Department of Computer Engineering, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran;Network Security Center, Department of Computer Engineering, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran
Venue:
VECoS'10 Proceedings of the Fourth international conference on Verification and Evaluation of Computer and Communication Systems
Year:
2010

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Abstract

Having a doubtless election in the information technology era requires satisfaction and verification of security properties in electronic voting (e-voting) systems. This paper focuses on verification of authentication-type properties of an e-voting protocol. The well-known FOO92 e-voting protocol is analyzed, as a case study, against the uniqueness and eligibility properties and their satisfaction are verified. By means of an automated formal approach, the protocol is modelled in the mCRL2 language, which is a combination of the ACP process algebra language and abstract data types (ADT). Then, the eligibility and uniqueness properties as two authentication-type requirements are modelled in the modal µ-calculus. These are given to a combination of dedicated mCRL2 tools to verify the properties. Our research is valuable due to its direct modelling of authentication-type properties and their verification. The experiment can be easily generalized as a pattern for verification of similar protocols.