From adaptive behavior to human cognition: a review of Enaction

  • Authors:

  • Tom Froese

  • Affiliations:

  • Ikegami Laboratory, University of Tokyo, Japan

  • Venue:
  • Adaptive Behavior - Animals, Animats, Software Agents, Robots, Adaptive Systems
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

Critics of the paradigm of enaction have long argued that enactive principles will be unable to account for the traditional domain of orthodox cognitive science, namely â聙聹higher-levelâ聙聺 cognition and specifically human cognition. Moreover, even many of the paradigm's â聙聹lower-levelâ聙聺 insights into embodiment and situatedness appear to be amenable to a functionalist reinterpretation. In this review, I show on the basis of the recently published collection of papers, Enaction, that the paradigm of enaction has (a) a unique foundation in the notion of sense-making that places fundamental limits on the scope of functionalist appropriation; (b) a unique perspective on higher-level cognition that sets important new research directions without the need for the concept of mental representation; (c) a new concept of specifically human cognition in terms of second-order sense-making; and (d) a rich variety of approaches to explain the evolutionary, historical, and developmental origins of this sophisticated human ability. I also indicate how studies of the role of embodiment for abstract human cognition can strengthen their position by reconceiving their notion of embodiment in enactive terms.