Incentives for sharing in peer-to-peer networks
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
Pastry: Scalable, Decentralized Object Location, and Routing for Large-Scale Peer-to-Peer Systems
Middleware '01 Proceedings of the IFIP/ACM International Conference on Distributed Systems Platforms Heidelberg
PPay: micropayments for peer-to-peer systems
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
ARA: A Robust Audit to Prevent Free-Riding in P2P Networks
P2P '05 Proceedings of the Fifth IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing
WhoPay: A Scalable and Anonymous Payment System for Peer-to-Peer Environments
ICDCS '06 Proceedings of the 26th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
SybilGuard: defending against sybil attacks via social networks
Proceedings of the 2006 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Peer-assisted content distribution with prices
CoNEXT '08 Proceedings of the 2008 ACM CoNEXT Conference
Reciprocity and barter in peer-to-peer systems
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
P2P trading in social networks: the value of staying connected
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
EnhancedBit: Unleashing the potential of the unchoking policy in the BitTorrent protocol
Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing
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Motivating peers to contribute services is critical to the success of peer-to-peer (P2P) systems. Incentive protocols use reciprocity to enforce contributions. Indirect reciprocity schemes are more efficient than direct reciprocity schemes for large-scale P2P systems under high churn rate. In this paper, we propose an indirect reciprocity scheme, called FairTrade, in which peers issue personal currencies to trade services in a P2P system. Personal currency enables indirect reciprocity without relying on any central banks or authorities. It wins extra robustness over global currency as well as much improved trading flexibility and efficiency over direct reciprocity schemes. The acceptance degree of a personal currency depends on the issuer's service capability and reliance. Peer credit limit is introduced to represent the amount of personal currency that will be accepted by other peers. Every peer as a creditor applies a Bayesian network model to setting peer credit limit for a trading partner peer as a creditee. The Bayesian network model learns the creditee's capability and reliability and anticipates the associated profits and risks for credit setting. Using simulations on a file-sharing P2P system, we demonstrate that FairTrade achieves 100% success rate of download requests without malicious peers, and maintains over 90% success rate even with 50% malicious nodes. The system warms up quickly and does not assume any altruistic service or other kind of help. On average, the system traffic stabilizes before peers issue their second download requests. All these good performances are achieved with extremely low trading overhead, which takes up less than 1% of the total traffic.