How to Achieve a McEliece-Based Digital Signature Scheme
ASIACRYPT '01 Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Cryptanalysis of the Hwang-Rao Secret Error-Correcting Code Schemes
ICICS '01 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Information and Communications Security
How to Mask the Structure of Codes for a Cryptographic Use
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Semantic security for the McEliece cryptosystem without random oracles
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Provably Secure Code-Based Threshold Ring Signatures
Cryptography and Coding '09 Proceedings of the 12th IMA International Conference on Cryptography and Coding
McEliece and niederreiter cryptosystems that resist quantum fourier sampling attacks
CRYPTO'11 Proceedings of the 31st annual conference on Advances in cryptology
Computational aspects of retrieving a representation of an algebraic geometry code
Journal of Symbolic Computation
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We show that it is possible to know whether the secret Goppa code of an instance of the McEliece public-key cryptosystem was chosen with a binary generator polynomial. Furthermore, whenever such a weak key is used, we present an attack which can be completed, for codes of length 1024 and dimension 524, with a large, but feasible amount of computation