Min-Max payoffs in a two-player location game

Authors:
S. Chawla;U. Rajan;R. Ravi;A. Sinha
Affiliations:
School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA;Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA;Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA;Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
Venue:
Operations Research Letters
Year:
2006

Citing 5
Cited 2

Algorithms in combinatorial geometry

Algorithms in combinatorial geometry
The one-round Voronoi game

Proceedings of the eighteenth annual symposium on Computational geometry
Competitive Facility Location along a Highway

COCOON '01 Proceedings of the 7th Annual International Conference on Computing and Combinatorics
Sustainable Pioneering Advantage? Profit Implications of Market Entry Order

Marketing Science
A Continuous Model for Multistore Competitive Location

Operations Research

Strategic design of competing centralized supply chain networks for markets with deterministic demands

Advances in Engineering Software
Strategic design of competing supply chain networks with foresight

Advances in Engineering Software

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

We consider a two-player, sequential location game with arbitrarily distributed consumer demand. Players alternately select locations from a feasible set so as to maximize the consumer mass in their vicinity. Our main result is a complete characterization of feasible market shares, when locations form a finite set in R^d.