A Joint Location-Inventory Model
Transportation Science
Channel Dynamics Under Price and Service Competition
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Competitive facility location: the Voronoi game
Theoretical Computer Science
Competition and Structure in Serial Supply Chains with Deterministic Demand
Management Science
Price and Delivery Logistics Competition in a Supply Chain
Management Science
Retailer- vs. Vendor-Managed Inventory and Brand Competition
Management Science
Constrained location of competitive facilities in the plane
Computers and Operations Research
A General Equilibrium Model for Industries with Price and Service Competition
Operations Research
Competition in Multiechelon Assembly Supply Chains
Management Science
Agency Costs in a Supply Chain with Demand Uncertainty and Price Competition
Management Science
Stochastic Transportation-Inventory Network Design Problem
Operations Research
Trade-offs Between Customer Service and Cost in Integrated Supply Chain Design
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Optimizing the size and locations of facilities in competitive multi-site service systems
Computers and Operations Research
Discrete models for competitive location with foresight
Computers and Operations Research
Leadership and Competition in Network Supply Chains
Management Science
Coordination Mechanisms for Supply Chains Under Price and Service Competition
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Min-Max payoffs in a two-player location game
Operations Research Letters
Competitive location on networks under delivered pricing
Operations Research Letters
Computers and Operations Research
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We consider models for duopolistic competitive supply chain network designing with sequential acting and variable delivered prices. These models design a multi-tier chain operating in markets under deterministic price-depended demands and with a rival chain present. The existing rival chain tends to open some new retailers to recapture some income in a near future. These rival chains' structures are assumed to be set ''once and for all'' in a sequential manner but further price adjustments are possible. This problem is modeled for each of the following two strategies: (1) the von Stackelberg strategy in which we assume the existing chain will choose its future entry sites in the way to optimize its market share. This problem is modeled by a linear binary bi-level program and solved by a combinatorial meta-heuristic. (2) the minimum regret strategy in which we assume the existing chain's future entry sites are totally unpredic, it is playing a ''game against nature''. This problem is modeled by linear binary programs.