Strategic design of competing supply chain networks with foresight

  • Authors:
  • Shabnam Rezapour;Reza Zanjirani Farahani;Seyed Hassan Ghodsipour;Sohrab Abdollahzadeh

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Industrial Engineering, Urmia University of Technology, Urmia, Iran;Department of Informatics and Operations Management, Kingston Business School, Kingston University, Kingston Hill, Kingston upon Thames, Surrey KT2 7LB, UK;Department of Industrial Engineering, Amirkabir University of Technology, Tehran, Iran;Department of Industrial Engineering, Urmia University of Technology, Urmia, Iran

  • Venue:
  • Advances in Engineering Software
  • Year:
  • 2011

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.00

Visualization

Abstract

We consider models for duopolistic competitive supply chain network designing with sequential acting and variable delivered prices. These models design a multi-tier chain operating in markets under deterministic price-depended demands and with a rival chain present. The existing rival chain tends to open some new retailers to recapture some income in a near future. These rival chains' structures are assumed to be set ''once and for all'' in a sequential manner but further price adjustments are possible. This problem is modeled for each of the following two strategies: (1) the von Stackelberg strategy in which we assume the existing chain will choose its future entry sites in the way to optimize its market share. This problem is modeled by a linear binary bi-level program and solved by a combinatorial meta-heuristic. (2) the minimum regret strategy in which we assume the existing chain's future entry sites are totally unpredic, it is playing a ''game against nature''. This problem is modeled by linear binary programs.