A generalized quantity discount pricing model to increase supplier's profits
Management Science
The role of inventory in delivery-time competition
Management Science
Optimal service speeds in a competitive environment
Management Science
Pricing and delivery-time performance in a competitive environment
Management Science
Channel coordination and quantity discounts
Management Science
Information distortion in a supply chain: the bullwhip effect
Management Science - Special issue on frontier research in manufacturing and logistics
Customer Service Competition in Capacitated Systems
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Competition and Outsourcing with Scale Economies
Management Science
A Supplier's Optimal Quantity Discount Policy Under Asymmetric Information
Management Science
Outsourcing via Service Competition
Management Science
Procuring Fast Delivery: Sole Sourcing with Information Asymmetry
Management Science
Coordination and price competition in a duopoly common retailer supply chain
Computers and Industrial Engineering
A comprehensive decision-making model for risk management of supply chain
Expert Systems with Applications: An International Journal
Strategic design of competing supply chain networks with foresight
Advances in Engineering Software
Large-Scale Service Marketplaces: The Role of the Moderating Firm
Management Science
Establishing Nash equilibrium of the manufacturer---supplier game in supply chain management
Journal of Global Optimization
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We consider a supply chain in which two suppliers compete for supply to a customer. Pricing and delivery-frequency decisions in the system are analyzed by two three-stage noncooperative games with different decision rights designated to the parties involved. The customer first sets the price (or delivery frequency) for each supplier. Then, the suppliers offer the delivery frequencies (or prices) simultaneously and independently. Finally, the customer determines how much demand to allocate to each of the suppliers. We show that delivery frequency, similar to delivery speed in time-based competition, can be a source of competitive advantage. It also allows firms that sell identical products to offer complementary services to the customer because she can lower her inventory with deliveries from more suppliers. In general, higher delivery frequencies lower the value of getting deliveries from the second supplier and therefore intensify price competition. Assuming the cost structures do not change and the suppliers are identical, we show that when the customer controls deliveries, she would strategically increase delivery frequencies to lower prices. The distortion in delivery frequencies is larger and the overall performance of the supply chain is lower when the customer, not the suppliers, controls deliveries. Moreover, the customer is better off under delivery competition, while the suppliers are better off under price competition.