Pricing computer services: queueing effects
Communications of the ACM
User delay costs and internal pricing for a service facility
Management Science
The role of inventory in delivery-time competition
Management Science
Optimal service speeds in a competitive environment
Management Science
Pricing and delivery-time performance in a competitive environment
Management Science
Centralization of Stocks: Retailers Vs. Manufacturer
Management Science
Coordinating Investment, Production, and Subcontracting
Management Science
Customer Service Competition in Capacitated Systems
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Customer Loyalty and Supplier Quality Competition
Management Science
Customer Loyalty and Supplier Quality Competition
Management Science
Price and Delivery Logistics Competition in a Supply Chain
Management Science
Bargaining for cooperative economic ordering
Decision Support Systems
Knowledge sharing and cooperation in outsourcing projects - A game theoretic analysis
Decision Support Systems
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Call-Routing Schemes for Call-Center Outsourcing
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Competition in Service Industries
Operations Research
Competitive equilibrium in e-commerce: Pricing and outsourcing
Computers and Operations Research
Procuring Fast Delivery: Sole Sourcing with Information Asymmetry
Management Science
The impact of process standardization on business process outsourcing success
Information Systems Frontiers
Price competition with service level guarantee in web services
Decision Support Systems
Incentives for Quality Through Endogenous Routing
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Service Provider Competition: Delay Cost Structure, Segmentation, and Cost Advantage
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Pricing and Dimensioning Competing Large-Scale Service Providers
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Investment and Market Structure in Industries with Congestion
Operations Research
Leadtime-Variety Tradeoff in Product Differentiation
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Expert Systems with Applications: An International Journal
Computers and Industrial Engineering
Quality--Speed Conundrum: Trade-offs in Customer-Intensive Services
Management Science
Market Heterogeneity and Local Capacity Decisions in Services
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Asymmetric Information and Economies of Scale in Service Contracting
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
The Benefits of Competitive Upward Channel Decentralization
Management Science
Centralized vs. Decentralized Ambulance Diversion: A Network Perspective
Management Science
The Labor Illusion: How Operational Transparency Increases Perceived Value
Management Science
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Linear convergence of tatônnement in a bertrand oligopoly
ICCSA'06 Proceedings of the 2006 international conference on Computational Science and Its Applications - Volume Part III
The Strategic Perils of Low Cost Outsourcing
Management Science
Large-Scale Service Marketplaces: The Role of the Moderating Firm
Management Science
Establishing Nash equilibrium of the manufacturer---supplier game in supply chain management
Journal of Global Optimization
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Scale economies are commonplace in operations, yet because of analytical challenges, relatively little is known about how firms should compete in their presence. This paper presents a model of competition between two firms that face scale economies; (i.e., each firm's cost per unit of demand is decreasing in demand). A general framework is used, which incorporates competition between two service providers with price- and time-sensitive demand (a queuing game), and competition between two retailers with fixed-ordering costs and pricesensitive consumers (an Economic Order Quantity game). Reasonably general conditions are provided under which there exists at most one equilibrium, with both firms participating in the market. We demonstrate, in the context of the queuing game, that the lower cost firm in equilibrium may have a higher market share and a higher price, an enviable situation. We also allow each firm to outsource their production process to a supplier. Even if the supplier's technology is no better than the firms' technology and the supplier is required to establish dedicated capacity (so the supplier's scale can be no greater than either firm's scale), we show that the firms strictly prefer to outsource. We conclude that scale economies provide a strong motivation for outsourcing that has not previously been identified in the literature.