Optimal service speeds in a competitive environment
Management Science
Price and Time Competition for Service Delivery
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Competition and Outsourcing with Scale Economies
Management Science
Competition in Service Industries
Operations Research
Capacity competition of make-to-order firms
Operations Research Letters
Competition in Service Industries
Operations Research
Price competition with service level guarantee in web services
Decision Support Systems
Competition in Service Industries with Segmented Markets
Management Science
Service Provider Competition: Delay Cost Structure, Segmentation, and Cost Advantage
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Contracting for Collaborative Services
Management Science
Pricing and Dimensioning Competing Large-Scale Service Providers
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Investment and Market Structure in Industries with Congestion
Operations Research
Quality--Speed Conundrum: Trade-offs in Customer-Intensive Services
Management Science
Promised Delivery Time and Capacity Games in Time-Based Competition
Management Science
Integrated capacity and marketing incentive contracting for capital-intensive service systems
Decision Support Systems
Centralized vs. Decentralized Ambulance Diversion: A Network Perspective
Management Science
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Product and Price Competition with Satiation Effects
Management Science
Large-Scale Service Marketplaces: The Role of the Moderating Firm
Management Science
Pricing Time-Sensitive Services Based on Realized Performance
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Price and leadtime competition, and coordination for make-to-order supply chains
Computers and Industrial Engineering
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We analyze a general market for an industry of competing service facilities. Firms differentiate themselves by their price levels and the waiting time their customers experience, as well as different attributes not determined directly through competition. Our model therefore assumes that the expected demand experienced by a given firm may depend on all of the industry's price levels as well as a (steady-state) waiting-time standard, which each of the firms announces and commits itself to by proper adjustment of its capacity level. We focus primarily on a separable specification, which in addition is linear in the prices. (Alternative nonseparable or nonlinear specifications are discussed in the concluding section.) We define a firm's service level as the difference between an upper-bound benchmark for the waiting-time standard (w脤聟) and the firm's actual waiting-time standard. Different types of competition and the resulting equilibrium behavior may arise, depending on the industry dynamics through which the firms select their strategic choices. In one case, firms may initially select their waiting-time standards, followed by a selection of their prices in a second stage (service-level first). Alternatively, the sequence of strategic choices may be reversed (price first) or, as a third alternative, the firms may make their choices simultaneously (simultaneous competition). We model each of the service facilities as a single-server M/M/1 queueing facility, which receives a given firm-specific price for each customer served. Each firm incurs a given cost per customer served as well as cost per unit of time proportional to its adopted capacity level.