Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Competition in Service Industries
Operations Research
Procuring Fast Delivery: Sole Sourcing with Information Asymmetry
Management Science
Pricing decision and lead time setting in a duopoly semiconductor industry
Proceedings of the 40th Conference on Winter Simulation
Price competition with service level guarantee in web services
Decision Support Systems
Service Provider Competition: Delay Cost Structure, Segmentation, and Cost Advantage
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Investment and Market Structure in Industries with Congestion
Operations Research
Promised Delivery Time and Capacity Games in Time-Based Competition
Management Science
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Linear convergence of tatônnement in a bertrand oligopoly
ICCSA'06 Proceedings of the 2006 international conference on Computational Science and Its Applications - Volume Part III
Integrated pricing and capacity decision for a telecommunication service provider
Multimedia Tools and Applications
Price and leadtime competition, and coordination for make-to-order supply chains
Computers and Industrial Engineering
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Many service firms use delivery time guarantees to compete for customers in the marketplace. In this research we develop a stylized model to analyze the impact of using time guarantees on competition. Demands are assumed to be sensitive to both the price and delivery time guarantees, and the objective of each firm is to select the best price and time guarantee to maximize its operating profit. We first analyze the optimization problem for the individual firms and then study the equilibrium solution in a multiple-firm competition. Using a numerical study, we further illustrate how the different firm and market characteristics would affect the price and delivery time competition in the market. Our results suggest that the equilibrium price and time guarantee decisions in an oligopolistic market with identical firms behave in a similar fashion as the optimal solution in a monopolistic situation from a previous study. However, when there are heterogeneous firms in the market, these firms will exploit their distinctive firm characteristics to differentiate their services. Assuming all other factors being equal, the high capacity firms provide better time guarantees, while firms with lower operating costs offer lower prices, and the differentiation becomes more acute as demands become more time-sensitive. Furthermore, as time-attractiveness of the market increases, firms compete less on price, and the equilibrium prices of the firms increase as a result. Our findings provide important implications about firm behaviour under price and time competition.