Linear convergence of tatônnement in a bertrand oligopoly

Authors:
Guillermo Gallego;Woonghee Tim Huh;Wanmo Kang;Robert Phillips
Affiliations:
Columbia University, New York;Columbia University, New York;Columbia University, New York;Stanford University and Nomis Solutions
Venue:
ICCSA'06 Proceedings of the 2006 international conference on Computational Science and Its Applications - Volume Part III
Year:
2006

Citing 4
Cited 0

Logit Demand Estimation Under Competitive Pricing Behavior: An Equilibrium Framework

Management Science
Price and Time Competition for Service Delivery

Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Competition and Outsourcing with Scale Economies

Management Science
A General Equilibrium Model for Industries with Price and Service Competition

Operations Research

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

We show the linear convergence of the tatônnement scheme in a Bertrand oligopoly price competition game using a possibly asymmetric attraction demand model with convex costs. To demonstrate this, we also show the existence of the equilibrium.