Competition and Outsourcing with Scale Economies
Management Science
Commissioned Paper: Telephone Call Centers: Tutorial, Review, and Research Prospects
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
How Multiserver Queues Scale with Growing Congestion-Dependent Demand
Operations Research
Dimensioning Large Call Centers
Operations Research
Competition in Service Industries
Operations Research
Dimensioning Large-Scale Membership Services
Operations Research
Competition in Service Industries with Segmented Markets
Management Science
Incentives for Quality Through Endogenous Routing
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Exploiting Market Size in Service Systems
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Heavy traffic approximation of equilibria in resource sharing games
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Large-Scale Service Marketplaces: The Role of the Moderating Firm
Management Science
The concert queueing game: strategic arrivals with waiting and tardiness costs
Queueing Systems: Theory and Applications
A Game-Theoretic Model for Dynamic Pricing and Competition among Cloud Providers
UCC '13 Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE/ACM 6th International Conference on Utility and Cloud Computing
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The literature on many-server approximations provides significant simplifications toward the optimal capacity sizing of large-scale monopolists, but falls short of providing similar simplifications for a competitive setting in which each firm's decision is affected by its competitors' actions. In this paper, we introduce a framework that combines many-server heavy-traffic analysis with the notion of epsilon-Nash equilibrium and apply it to the study of equilibria in a market with multiple large-scale service providers that compete on both prices and response times. In an analogy to fluid and diffusion approximations for queueing systems, we introduce the notions of fluid game and diffusion game. The proposed framework allows us to provide first-order and second-order characterization results for the equilibria in these markets. We use our results to provide insights into the price and service-level choices in the market and, in particular, into the impact of market scale on the interdependence between these two strategic decisions.