The structure of equilibria in market share attraction models
Management Science
A continuous review model for an inventory system with two supply modes
Management Science
Sole versus dual sourcing in stochastic lead-time (s,Q) inventory models
Management Science
Optimal service speeds in a competitive environment
Management Science
Diversification under supply uncertainty
Management Science
Management Science
Note. An acquisition policy for a single item multi-supplier system
Management Science
Supply Contract Competition and Sourcing Policies
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Customer Service Competition in Capacitated Systems
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Optimal Replenishment and Rework with Multiple Unreliable Supply Sources
Operations Research
Stocking Retail Assortments Under Dynamic Consumer Substitution
Operations Research
Designing Optimal Sales Contests: A Theoretical Perspective
Marketing Science
Supply Chain Coordination when Demand Is Shelf-Space Dependent
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Customer Loyalty and Supplier Quality Competition
Management Science
Inventory Competition Under Dynamic Consumer Choice
Operations Research
Product Differentiation and Capacity Cost Interaction in Time and Price Sensitive Markets
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Centralized and Competitive Inventory Models with Demand Substitution
Operations Research
Price and Delivery Logistics Competition in a Supply Chain
Management Science
A General Equilibrium Model for Industries with Price and Service Competition
Operations Research
On the Benefits of Pooling in Production-Inventory Systems
Management Science
Procuring Fast Delivery: Sole Sourcing with Information Asymmetry
Management Science
Management Science
Game theory and the practice of revenue management
Proceedings of the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory: Conference on Future Directions
Supplier diversification: effect of discrete demand
Operations Research Letters
Call-Routing Schemes for Call-Center Outsourcing
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Incentives for Quality Through Endogenous Routing
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Operational causes of bankruptcy propagation in supply chain
Decision Support Systems
The Strategic Perils of Low Cost Outsourcing
Management Science
Establishing Nash equilibrium of the manufacturer---supplier game in supply chain management
Journal of Global Optimization
Price and leadtime competition, and coordination for make-to-order supply chains
Computers and Industrial Engineering
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We consider a single buyer who wishes to outsource a fixed demand for a manufactured good or service at a fixed price to a set of potential suppliers. We examine the value of competition as a mechanism for the buyer to elicit service quality from the suppliers. We compare two approaches the buyer could use to orchestrate this competition: (1) a supplier-allocation (SA) approach, which allocates a proportion of demand to each supplier with the proportion allocated to a supplier increasing in the quality of service the supplier promises to offer, and (2) a supplier-selection (SS) approach, which allocates all demand to one supplier with the probability that a particular supplier is selected increasing in the quality of service to which the supplier commits. In both cases, suppliers incur a cost whenever they receive a positive portion of demand, with this cost increasing in the quality of service they offer and the demand they receive. The analysis reveals that (a) a buyer could indeed orchestrate a competition among potential suppliers to promote service quality, (b) under identical allocation functions, the existence of a demand-independent service cost gives a distinct advantage to SS-type competitions, in terms of higher service quality for the buyer and higher expected profit for the supplier, (c) the relative advantage of SS versus SA depends on the magnitude of demand-independent versus demand-dependent service costs, (d) in the presence of a demand-independent service cost, a buyer should limit the number of competing suppliers under SA competition but impose no such limits under SS competition, and (e) a buyer can induce suppliers to provide higher service levels by selecting an appropriate allocation function. We illustrate the impact of these results through three example applications.