Intertemporal service pricing with strategic customers

  • Authors:
  • Pengfei Guo;John J. Liu;Yulan Wang

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Logistics and Maritime Studies, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong;Department of Logistics and Maritime Studies, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong;Department of Logistics and Maritime Studies, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong

  • Venue:
  • Operations Research Letters
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

We study a two-period intertemporal pricing game in a single-server service system with forward-looking strategic customers who make their purchase decision based on current information and anticipated future gains. Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) prices are derived. A comparison between revenue-maximizing equilibrium prices and welfare-maximizing equilibrium prices is conducted and the impact on the system's performance of misunderstanding customers' type is evaluated.