STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Theoretical Computer Science
The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
Completeness theorems for non-cryptographic fault-tolerant distributed computation
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Multiparty unconditionally secure protocols
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Verifiable secret sharing and multiparty protocols with honest majority
STOC '89 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Adaptively secure multi-party computation
STOC '96 Proceedings of the twenty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
An axiomatic basis for computer programming
Communications of the ACM
A short introduction to intuitionistic logic
A short introduction to intuitionistic logic
Alternating-time temporal logic
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
A compositional logic for proving security properties of protocols
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW14
Symbolic Model Checking the Knowledge of the Dining Cryptographers
CSFW '04 Proceedings of the 17th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Collaborative Planning With Privacy
CSF '07 Proceedings of the 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
On the logic of cooperation and propositional control
Artificial Intelligence
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The article introduces a new formal system, the calculus of cooperation, for reasoning about coalitions of players in a certain class of games. The calculus is an extension of the propositional intuitionistic logic that adds a coalition parameter to intuitionistic implication. The system is shown to be sound and complete with respect to a game semantics. One intended application of the calculus of cooperation is the verification of privacy properties in multiparty computation protocols. The article argues that such properties can be established by providing a set of strategies for a non-zero-sum, perfect information game based on the protocol. It concludes with several examples of such verifications formalized in the calculus of cooperation.