The architecture of mind: a connectionist approach
Foundations of cognitive science
Parallel distributed processing: explorations in the microstructure of cognition, vol. 1: foundations
Parallel distributed processing: explorations in the microstructure, vol. 2: psychological and biological models
Intelligence without representation
Artificial Intelligence
Mapbuilding using self-organising networks in “really useful robots”
Proceedings of the first international conference on simulation of adaptive behavior on From animals to animats
Proceedings of the fifth international conference on simulation of adaptive behavior on From animals to animats 5
Grounding and the Entailment Structure in Robots and Artificial Life
Proceedings of the Third European Conference on Advances in Artificial Life
Interactivistm: a Functional Model of Representation for Behavior-Based Systems
Proceedings of the Third European Conference on Advances in Artificial Life
A dynamic perspective on an agent's mental states and interaction with its environment
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 2
Communication of Social Agents and the Digital City - A Semiotic Perspective
Revised Papers from the Second Kyoto Workshop on Digital Cities II, Computational and Sociological Approaches
Computation and Intentionality: A Recipe for Epistemic Impasse
Minds and Machines
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Information and representation are thought to be intimately related. Representation, in fact, is commonly considered to be a special kind of information. It must be a special kind, because otherwise all of the myriad instances of informational relationships in the universe would be representational - some restrictions must be placed on informational relationships in order to refine the vast set into those that are truly representational. I will argue that information in this general sense is important to genuine agents, but that it is a blind alley with regard to the attempt to understand representation. On the other hand, I will also argue that a different, quite non-standard, form of information is central to genuine representation. First, I turn to some of the reasons why information as usually considered is the wrong category for understanding representation; second, to an alternative model of representation - one that is naturally emergent in autonomous agents, and that does involve information, but not in standard form; and third, I return to standard notions of informational relationships and show what they are in fact useful for.