The society of mind
SOAR: an architecture for general intelligence
Artificial Intelligence
On designing a visual system# (towards a Gibsonian computational model of vision)
Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence
Attitudes toward intelligent machines
Computers & thought
Affective computing
Artificial intelligence: a new synthesis
Artificial intelligence: a new synthesis
Building cognitively rich agents using the SIM_Agent toolkit
Communications of the ACM
A Computer Model of Skill Acquisition
A Computer Model of Skill Acquisition
Brains, Behavior and Robotics
Interacting Trajectories in Design Space and Niche Space: A Philosopher Speculates About Evolution
PPSN VI Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Parallel Problem Solving from Nature
Agents with or without Emotions?
Proceedings of the Fifteenth International Florida Artificial Intelligence Research Society Conference
Affect and machine design: Lessons for the development of autonomous machines
IBM Systems Journal
Cybernetics, Second Edition: or the Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine
Cybernetics, Second Edition: or the Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine
Teleo-reactive programs for agent control
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
The importance of cognitive architectures: an analysis based on CLARION
Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence
Philosophical foundations of artificial consciousness
Artificial Intelligence in Medicine
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Animals and robots perceiving and acting in a world require an ontology that accommodates entities, processes, states of affairs, etc., in their environment. If the perceived environment includes information-processing systems, the ontology should reflect that. Scientists studying such systems need an ontology that includes the first-order ontology characterising physical phenomena, the second-order ontology characterising perceivers of physical phenomena, and a (recursive) third order ontology characterising perceivers of perceivers, including introspectors. We argue that second- and third-order ontologies refer to contents of virtual machines and examine requirements for scientific investigation of combined virtual and physical machines, such as animals and robots. We show how the CogAff architecture schema, combining reactive, deliberative, and meta-management categories, provides a first draft schematic third-order ontology for describing a wide range of natural and artificial agents. Many previously proposed architectures use only a subset of CogAff, including subsumption architectures, contention-scheduling systems, architectures with 'executive functions' and a variety of types of 'Omega' architectures. Adding a multiply-connected, fast-acting 'alarm' mechanism within the CogAff framework accounts for several varieties of emotions. H-CogAff, a special case of CogAff, is postulated as a minimal architecture specification for a human-like system. We illustrate use of the CogAff schema in comparing H-CogAff with Clarion, a well known architecture. One implication is that reliance on concepts tied to observation and experiment can harmfully restrict explanatory theorising, since what an information processor is doing cannot, in general, be determined by using the standard observational techniques of the physical sciences or laboratory experiments. Like theoretical physics, cognitive science needs to be highly speculative to make progress.