Detecting and correcting malicious data in VANETs
Proceedings of the 1st ACM international workshop on Vehicular ad hoc networks
Design and analysis of a lightweight certificate revocation mechanism for VANET
Proceedings of the sixth ACM international workshop on VehiculAr InterNETworking
Misbehavior detection scheme with integrated root cause detection in VANET
Proceedings of the sixth ACM international workshop on VehiculAr InterNETworking
TACKing together efficient authentication, revocation, and privacy in VANETs
SECON'09 Proceedings of the 6th Annual IEEE communications society conference on Sensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks
Real-world VANET security protocol performance
GLOBECOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Global telecommunications
Communication requirements for crash avoidance
Proceedings of the seventh ACM international workshop on VehiculAr InterNETworking
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Identifying and removing malicious insiders from a network is a topic of active research. Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) may suffer from insider attacks; that is, an attacker may use authorized vehicles to attack other vehicles. Specifically, attackers may use their vehicles to broadcast specially formed packets that will trigger warnings in target vehicles. This malicious behavior could have a significant detrimental effect on cooperative safety applications (SAs), one of the driving forces behind VANET deployment. We propose modifications to the intersection collision warning (ICW) SA that enable a certificate authority (CA) to be offline and yet to decide to revoke a vehicle's certificates using retransmitted information that cannot repudiated. Our approach differs from previous proposals in that it is SA specific, and it is immune to Sybil attacks. We simulate and measure the resources an attacker requires to attack a vehicle using the ICW SA without our modifications and demonstrate that our additions reduce the false positive rate arising from errors in estimated vehicle dynamics.