TACKing together efficient authentication, revocation, and privacy in VANETs

  • Authors:
  • Ahren Studer;Elaine Shi;Fan Bai;Adrian Perrig

  • Affiliations:
  • Carnegie Mellon University;Carnegie Mellon University;General Motors;Carnegie Mellon University

  • Venue:
  • SECON'09 Proceedings of the 6th Annual IEEE communications society conference on Sensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) require a mechanism to help authenticate messages, identify valid vehicles, and remove malevolent vehicles. A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) can provide this functionality using certificates and fixed public keys. However, fixed keys allow an eavesdropper to associate a key with a vehicle and a location, violating drivers' privacy. In this work we propose a VANET key management scheme based on Temporary Anonymous Certified Keys (TACKs). Our scheme efficiently prevents eavesdroppers from linking a vehicle's different keys and provides timely revocation of misbehaving participants while maintaining the same or less overhead for vehicle-to-vehicle communication as the current IEEE 1609.2 standard for VANET security.