Abiding geocast: time--stable geocast for ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM international workshop on Vehicular ad hoc networks
Efficient and robust pseudonymous authentication in VANET
Proceedings of the fourth ACM international workshop on Vehicular ad hoc networks
Secure and efficient beaconing for vehicular networks
Proceedings of the fifth ACM international workshop on VehiculAr Inter-NETworking
TACKing together efficient authentication, revocation, and privacy in VANETs
SECON'09 Proceedings of the 6th Annual IEEE communications society conference on Sensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks
VANET alert endorsement using multi-source filters
Proceedings of the seventh ACM international workshop on VehiculAr InterNETworking
Efficient and secure threshold-based event validation for VANETs
Proceedings of the fourth ACM conference on Wireless network security
Comprehensive experimental analyses of automotive attack surfaces
SEC'11 Proceedings of the 20th USENIX conference on Security
On the security of public key protocols
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Secure vehicular communication systems: design and architecture
IEEE Communications Magazine
Secure vehicular communication systems: implementation, performance, and research challenges
IEEE Communications Magazine
Communication patterns in VANETs
IEEE Communications Magazine
Efficient Certificate Revocation List Organization and Distribution
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
There has been considerable work addressing security in vehicular network systems for Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) usages. We examine the risks and proposed security solutions in this space. Our analysis leads to several key observations. The current security work misses many practical ITS usage and security requirements, since it fails to consider practical economic models and critical ITS functional requirements as a control system. Consequently, the standardized ITS communication message authenticity solutions have little utility relative to addressing the real threats. Furthermore, we discovered that fundamental re-thinking of the public key infrastructure support for secure vehicular communication is essential, because of the multi-stakeholder and cross-domain nature of many ITS usages. Based on our analysis, we call for future research directions in analyzing practical problems and designing solutions to secure vehicular communication in order to achieve its full potential.