Authentication and integrity in outsourced databases
ACM Transactions on Storage (TOS)
Pors: proofs of retrievability for large files
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Provable data possession at untrusted stores
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Efficient Remote Data Possession Checking in Critical Information Infrastructures
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering
MR-PDP: Multiple-Replica Provable Data Possession
ICDCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 The 28th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Proceedings of the 4th ACM international workshop on Storage security and survivability
Publicly Verifiable Remote Data Integrity
ICICS '08 Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Information and Communications Security
Proofs of Retrievability via Hardness Amplification
TCC '09 Proceedings of the 6th Theory of Cryptography Conference on Theory of Cryptography
HAIL: a high-availability and integrity layer for cloud storage
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Proofs of retrievability: theory and implementation
Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on Cloud computing security
Proofs of Storage from Homomorphic Identification Protocols
ASIACRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
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For an increased level of scalability, availability and durability, some customers may want their data to be replicated on multiple cloud servers. The more copies the cloud service provider (CSP) is asked to store, the more fees the customers are charged. In this paper, we propose a pairing-based provable multi-copy data possession (PB-PMDP) scheme, which provides an evidence to the customers that all outsourced copies are actually stored and remain intact. Moreover, it allows authorized users (i.e., those who have the right to access the owner's file) to seamlessly access the file copies stored by the CSP, and supports public verifiability. The proposed scheme is proved to be secure against colluding servers. We illustrate the performance of the PB-PMDP scheme through theoretical analysis, which is validated by experimental results. The verification time of our scheme is practically independent of the number of file copies. Additionally, we discuss how to identify corrupted copies by slightly modifying the proposed PB-PMDP scheme.