Proofs of retrievability: theory and implementation

  • Authors:
  • Kevin D. Bowers;Ari Juels;Alina Oprea

  • Affiliations:
  • RSA Laboratories, Cambridge, MA, USA;RSA Laboratories, Cambridge, MA, USA;RSA Laboratories, Cambridge, MA, USA

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on Cloud computing security
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

A proof of retrievability (POR) is a compact proof by a file system (prover) to a client (verifier) that a target file F is intact, in the sense that the client can fully recover it. As PORs incur lower communication complexity than transmission of F itself, they are an attractive building block for high-assurance remote storage systems. In this paper, we propose a theoretical framework for the design of PORs. Our framework improves the previously proposed POR constructions of Juels-Kaliski and Shacham-Waters, and also sheds light on the conceptual limitations of previous theoretical models for PORs. It supports a fully Byzantine adversarial model, carrying only the restriction---fundamental to all PORs---that the adversary's error rate be bounded when the client seeks to extract F. We propose a new variant on the Juels-Kaliski protocol and describe a prototype implementation. We demonstrate practical encoding even for files F whose size exceeds that of client main memory.