An investigation of geographic mapping techniques for internet hosts
Proceedings of the 2001 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Store, Forget, and Check: Using Algebraic Signatures to Check Remotely Administered Storage
ICDCS '06 Proceedings of the 26th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Towards IP geolocation using delay and topology measurements
Proceedings of the 6th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement
Constraint-based geolocation of internet hosts
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Pors: proofs of retrievability for large files
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Provable data possession at untrusted stores
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Auditing to keep online storage services honest
HOTOS'07 Proceedings of the 11th USENIX workshop on Hot topics in operating systems
MR-PDP: Multiple-Replica Provable Data Possession
ICDCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 The 28th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Proceedings of the 4th ACM international workshop on Storage security and survivability
Scalable and efficient provable data possession
Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Security and privacy in communication netowrks
The complexity of online memory checking
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Compact Proofs of Retrievability
ASIACRYPT '08 Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '09 Proceedings of the 29th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Dynamic provable data possession
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Proofs of retrievability: theory and implementation
Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on Cloud computing security
Proofs of Storage from Homomorphic Identification Protocols
ASIACRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Assessing the geographic resolution of exhaustive tabulation for geolocating internet hosts
PAM'08 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Passive and active network measurement
Enabling public verifiability and data dynamics for storage security in cloud computing
ESORICS'09 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Research in computer security
Multiobjective monitoring for SLA compliance
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Dude, where’s that IP?: circumventing measurement-based IP geolocation
USENIX Security'10 Proceedings of the 19th USENIX conference on Security
IP geolocation databases: unreliable?
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Octant: a comprehensive framework for the geolocalization of internet hosts
NSDI'07 Proceedings of the 4th USENIX conference on Networked systems design & implementation
Do you know where your cloud files are?
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Cloud computing security workshop
Proofs of ownership in remote storage systems
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
How to tell if your cloud files are vulnerable to drive crashes
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A position paper on data sovereignty: the importance of geolocating data in the cloud
HotCloud'11 Proceedings of the 3rd USENIX conference on Hot topics in cloud computing
Providing a data location assurance service for cloud storage environments
Journal of Mobile Multimedia
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We introduce and analyze a general framework for authentically binding data to a location while providing strong assurances against cloud storage providers that (either accidentally or maliciously) attempt to re-locate cloud data. We then evaluate a preliminary solution in this framework that combines constraint-based host geolocation with proofs of data possession, called constraint-based data geolocation (CBDG). We evaluate CBDG using a combination of experiments with PlanetLab and real cloud storage services, demonstrating that we can bind fetched data to the location originally hosting it with high precision. We geolocate data hosted on the majority of our PlanetLab targets to regions no larger than 118,000 km^2, and we geolocate data hosted on Amazon S3 to an area no larger than 12,000 km^2, sufficiently small to identify the state or service region.