The Complexity of Online Memory Checking

  • Authors:
  • Moni Naor;Guy N. Rothblum

  • Affiliations:
  • Weizmann Institute of Science;Weizmann Institute of Science

  • Venue:
  • FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
  • Year:
  • 2005

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Abstract

We consider the problem of storing a large file on a remote and unreliable server. To verify that the file has not been corrupted, a user could store a small private (randomized) "fingerprint" on his own computer. This is the setting for the well-studied authentication problem in cryptography, and the required fingerprint size is well understood. We study the problem of sub-linear authentication: suppose the user would like to encode and store the file in a way that allows him to verify that it has not been corrupted, but without reading the entire file. If the user only wants to read t bits of the file, how large does the size s of the private fingerprint need to be?We define this problem formally, and show a tight lower bound on the relationship between s and t when the adversary is not computationally bounded, namely: s 脳 t = \Omega(n), where n is the file size. This is an easier case of the online memory checking problem, introduced by Blum et al. in 1991, and hence the same (tight) lower bound applies also to that problem. It was previously shown that when the adversary is computationally bounded, under the assumption that one-way functions exist, it is possible to construct much better online memory checkers and sub-linear authentication schemes. We show that the existence of one-way functions is also a necessary condition: even slightly breaking the s 脳 t = \Omega(n) lower bound in a computational setting implies the existence of one-way functions.