ICICS'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Information and Communications Security
Subtle kinks in distance-bounding: an analysis of prominent protocols
Proceedings of the sixth ACM conference on Security and privacy in wireless and mobile networks
Balancing security and utility in medical devices?
Proceedings of the 50th Annual Design Automation Conference
Heart-to-heart (H2H): authentication for implanted medical devices
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
A system architecture, processor, and communication protocol for secure implants
ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization (TACO)
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After several years of theoretical research on distance bounding protocols, the first implementations of such protocols have recently started to appear. These protocols are typically analyzed with respect to three types of attacks, which are historically known as Distance Fraud, Mafia Fraud, and Terrorist Fraud. We define and analyze a fourth main type of attack on distance bounding protocols, called Distance Hijacking. This type of attack poses a serious threat in many practical scenarios. We show that many proposed distance bounding protocols are vulnerable to Distance Hijacking, and we propose solutions to make these protocols resilient to this type of attack. We show that verifying distance bounding protocols using existing informal and formal frameworks does not guarantee the absence of Distance Hijacking attacks. We extend a formal framework for reasoning about distance bounding protocols to include overshadowing attacks. We use the resulting framework to prove the absence of all of the found attacks for protocols to which our countermeasures have been applied.