Applying electric field sensing to human-computer interfaces
CHI '95 Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
Personal area networks: near-field intrabody communication
IBM Systems Journal
The Resurrecting Duckling: Security Issues for Ad-hoc Wireless Networks
Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Security Protocols
Energy Scavenging for Mobile and Wireless Electronics
IEEE Pervasive Computing
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Security and Privacy for Implantable Medical Devices
IEEE Pervasive Computing
Pacemakers and Implantable Cardiac Defibrillators: Software Radio Attacks and Zero-Power Defenses
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Fuzzy Extractors: How to Generate Strong Keys from Biometrics and Other Noisy Data
SIAM Journal on Computing
Overview of candidate device technologies for storage-class memory
IBM Journal of Research and Development
Absence makes the heart grow fonder: new directions for implantable medical device security
HOTSEC'08 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on Hot topics in security
Key Agreement from Close Secrets over Unsecured Channels
EUROCRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 28th Annual International Conference on Advances in Cryptology: the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Proximity-based access control for implantable medical devices
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Physiological value-based efficient usable security solutions for body sensor networks
ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks (TOSN)
PSKA: usable and secure key agreement scheme for body area networks
IEEE Transactions on Information Technology in Biomedicine
IEEE Transactions on Information Technology in Biomedicine
They can hear your heartbeats: non-invasive security for implantable medical devices
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2011 conference
WISA'11 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information Security Applications
Using the Timing Information of Heartbeats as an Entity Identifier to Secure Body Sensor Network
IEEE Transactions on Information Technology in Biomedicine
Design challenges for secure implantable medical devices
Proceedings of the 49th Annual Design Automation Conference
A novel biometrics method to secure wireless body area sensor networks for telemedicine and m-health
IEEE Communications Magazine
Distance Hijacking Attacks on Distance Bounding Protocols
SP '12 Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Body area network security: robust key establishment using human body channel
HealthSec'12 Proceedings of the 3rd USENIX conference on Health Security and Privacy
Heart-to-heart (H2H): authentication for implanted medical devices
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
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Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs) are being embedded increasingly often in patients' bodies to monitor and help treat medical conditions. To facilitate monitoring and control, IMDs are often equipped with wireless interfaces. While convenient, wireless connectivity raises the risk of malicious access to an IMD that can potentially infringe patients' privacy and even endanger their lives. Thus, while ease of access to IMDs can be vital for timely medical intervention, too much ease is dangerous. Obvious approaches, such as passwords and certificates, are unworkable at large scale given the lack of central authorities and frequent emergencies in medical settings. Additionally, IMDs are heavily constrained in their power consumption and computational capabilities. Designing access-control mechanisms for IMDs that can meet the many constraints of real-world deployment is an important research challenge. In this paper, we review proposed approaches to the access-control problem for IMDs, including the problem of secure pairing (and key distribution) between an IMD and another device, such as a programmer. (We also treat related technologies, such as body-area networks.) We describe some limitations of well-conceived proposals and reveal security weaknesses in two proposed cryptographic pairing schemes. Our intention is to stimulate yet more inventive and rigorous research in the intriguing and challenging areas of IMD security and medical-device security in general.