Strategyproof classification

Authors:
Reshef Meir;Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
Affiliations:
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem;The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Venue:
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Year:
2011

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Abstract

Experts reporting the labels used by a learning algorithm cannot always be assumed to be truthful. We describe recent advances in the design and analysis of strategyproof mechanisms for binary classification, and their relation to other mechanism design problems.