Modelling a Public-Key Infrastructure
ESORICS '96 Proceedings of the 4th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
How to Time-Stamp a Digital Document
CRYPTO '90 Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
How to incorporate revocation status information into the trust metrics for public-key certification
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM symposium on Applied computing
EuroPKI '08 Proceedings of the 5th European PKI workshop on Public Key Infrastructure: Theory and Practice
A calculus of trust and its application to PKI and identity management
Proceedings of the 8th Symposium on Identity and Trust on the Internet
Design requirements for a secure time-stamping scheme
EuroIMSA '08 Proceedings of the IASTED International Conference on Internet and Multimedia Systems and Applications
Validity models of electronic signatures and their enforcement in practice
EuroPKI'09 Proceedings of the 6th European conference on Public key infrastructures, services and applications
Modeling public key infrastructures in the real world
EuroPKI'05 Proceedings of the Second European conference on Public Key Infrastructure
Modeling long-term signature validation for resolution of dispute
TOSCA'11 Proceedings of the 2011 international conference on Theory of Security and Applications
Certification validation: Back to the past
Computers & Mathematics with Applications
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Asymmetric cryptography based on public-private key pairs is nowadays used in many applications, notably for authentication and digital signature. It is very frequently used together with digital certificates which link public keys to real-world identities. In a system using digital certificates, one core issue is the question of whether a certificate is valid. This issue has been treated extensively in the literature. In this paper, we are interested in an issue which has received less attention: the question of whether a certificate was valid. This question is of particular importance for digitally signed documents which have to be verified a long time after their signature. We present and analyze a new algorithm to validate certificates "in the past", with the goals of it being simple to present, simple to implement and to fall back on standard algorithms with current time settings.