Finding Smallest Supertrees Under Minor Containment
WG '99 Proceedings of the 25th International Workshop on Graph-Theoretic Concepts in Computer Science
A survey on tree edit distance and related problems
Theoretical Computer Science
Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
SP '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Multi-Dimensional Range Query over Encrypted Data
SP '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Provably secure ciphertext policy ABE
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Approximate graph edit distance computation by means of bipartite graph matching
Image and Vision Computing
Conjunctive, subset, and range queries on encrypted data
TCC'07 Proceedings of the 4th conference on Theory of cryptography
Towards an information theoretic metric for anonymity
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Access control using pairing based cryptography
CT-RSA'03 Proceedings of the 2003 RSA conference on The cryptographers' track
Predicate encryption supporting disjunctions, polynomial equations, and inner products
EUROCRYPT'08 Proceedings of the theory and applications of cryptographic techniques 27th annual international conference on Advances in cryptology
Worry-free encryption: functional encryption with public keys
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
PKC'11 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Practice and theory in public key cryptography conference on Public key cryptography
EUROCRYPT'10 Proceedings of the 29th Annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
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Recently, cryptographic access control has received a lot of attention, mainly due to the availability of efficient Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) schemes. ABE allows to get rid of a trusted reference monitor by enforcing access rules in a cryptographic way. However, ABE has a privacy problem: The access policies are sent in clear along with the ciphertexts. Further generalizing the idea of policy-hiding in cryptographic access control, we introduce policy anonymity where --- similar to the well-understood concept of k -anonymity --- the attacker can only see a large set of possible policies that might have been used to encrypt, but is not able to identify the one that was actually used. We show that using a concept from graph theory we can extend a known ABE construction to achieve the desired privacy property.