A semi-dynamic evolutionary power control game

  • Authors:
  • Majed Haddad;Eitan Altman;Julien Gaillard;Dieter Fiems

  • Affiliations:
  • CERI/LIA, University of Avignon, Avignon, France;INRIA Sophia Antipolis, Sophia Antipolis, France;CERI/LIA, University of Avignon, Avignon, France,INRIA Sophia Antipolis, Sophia Antipolis, France;SMACS Research Group, TELIN Department, Ghent University, Belgium

  • Venue:
  • IFIP'12 Proceedings of the 11th international IFIP TC 6 conference on Networking - Volume Part II
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

In this paper, we study a power control game over a collision channel. Each player has an energy state. When choosing a higher transmission power, the chances of a successful transmission (in the presence of other interference) increases at the cost of a larger decrease in the energy state of the battery. A central feature in these games is that of the limitation on battery life. Natural questions that arise concern the behavior of mobile users in the presence of interference. How should a mobile user behave given his initial energy state? We study this dynamic game when restricting to simple non dynamic strategies that consist on choosing a given power level that is maintained during the lifetime of the battery. We identify a surprising paradox which we call the Hawk and Dove resource abundance paradox .