The Combination of Evidence in the Transferable Belief Model
IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence
Two views of belief: belief as generalized probability and belief as evidence
AAAI'90 Proceedings of the eighth National conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
The Water-Filling Game in Fading Multiple-Access Channels
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Distributed multiuser power control for digital subscriber lines
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
A semi-dynamic evolutionary power control game
IFIP'12 Proceedings of the 11th international IFIP TC 6 conference on Networking - Volume Part II
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In this paper, we revisit the power control problem in wireless networks by introducing a signaling game approach. This game is known in the literature as "Cheap Talk". Under the considered scenario, we consider two players named player I and player II. We assume that player I only knows his channel state without any information about the channel state of player II and vice-versa. Player I moves first and sends a signal to player II which can be accurate or distorted. Player II picks up his power control strategy based on this information and his belief about the nature of the informed player's information. In order to analyze such a model, the proposed scheme game is transformed into 4x4 matrix game. We establish the existence of Nash equilibria and show by numerical results the equilibria and the performance of the proposed signaling game.