From axiomatic to strategic models of bargaining with logical beliefs and goals

Authors:
Quoc Bao Vo;Minyi Li
Affiliations:
Swinburne University of Technology, Australia;Swinburne University of Technology, Australia
Venue:
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Year:
2012

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Abstract

In this paper, we introduce axiomatic and strategic models for bargaining and investigate the link between the two. Bargaining situations are described in propositional logic while the agents' preferences over the outcomes are expressed as ordinal preferences. Our main contribution is an axiomatic theory of bargaining. We propose a bargaining solution based on the well-known egalitarian social welfare for bargaining problems in which the agents' logical beliefs specify their bottom lines. We prove that the proposed solution is uniquely identified by a set of axioms. We further present a model of bargaining based on argumentation frameworks with the view to develop a strategic model of bargaining using the concept of minimal concession strategy in argument-based negotiation frameworks.