Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Implementing commitment-based interactions
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Multiagent commitment alignment
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Evolution prospection in decision making
Intelligent Decision Technologies
Trust Theory: A Socio-Cognitive and Computational Model
Trust Theory: A Socio-Cognitive and Computational Model
Intention recognition promotes the emergence of cooperation
Adaptive Behavior - Animals, Animats, Software Agents, Robots, Adaptive Systems
The evolution of cooperation in self-interested agent societies: a critical study
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
The role of intention recognition in the evolution of cooperative behavior
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume Two
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
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Agents make commitments towards others in order to influence others in a certain way, often by dismissing more profitable options. Most commitments depend on some incentive that is necessary to ensure that the action is in the agent's interest and thus, may be carried out to avoid eventual penalties. The capacity for using commitment strategies effectively is so important that natural selection may have shaped specialized capacities to make this possible. Evolutionary explanations for commitment, particularly its role in the evolution of cooperation, have been actively sought for and discussed in several fields, including Psychology and Philosophy. In this paper, using the tools of evolutionary game theory, we provide a new model showing that individuals tend to engage in commitments, which leads to the emergence of cooperation even without assuming repeated interactions. The model is characterized by two key parameters: the punishment cost of failing commitment imposed on either side of a commitment, and the cost of managing the commitment deal. Our analytical results and extensive computer simulations show that cooperation can emerge if the punishment cost is large enough compared to the management cost.