Toward a more civilized design: studying the effects of computers that apologize
International Journal of Human-Computer Studies
Implementing commitment-based interactions
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
In praise of forgiveness: Ways for repairing trust breakdowns in one-off online interactions
International Journal of Human-Computer Studies
International Journal of Electronic Commerce
Intention recognition promotes the emergence of cooperation
Adaptive Behavior - Animals, Animats, Software Agents, Robots, Adaptive Systems
Apologies as Signals: With Evidence from a Trust Game
Management Science
Do you care if a computer says sorry?: user experience design through affective messages
Proceedings of the Designing Interactive Systems Conference
The emergence of commitments and cooperation
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Intention Recognition, Commitment and Their Roles in the Evolution of Cooperation: From Artificial Intelligence Techniques to Evolutionary Game Theory Models
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When making a mistake, individuals can apologize to secure further cooperation, even if the apology is costly. Similarly, individuals arrange commitments to guarantee that an action such as a cooperative one is in the others' best interest, and thus will be carried out to avoid eventual penalties for commitment failure. Hence, both apology and commitment should go side by side in behavioral evolution. Here we provide a computational model showing that apologizing acts are rare in non-committed interactions, especially whenever cooperation is very costly, and that arranging prior commitments can considerably increase the frequency of such behavior. In addition, we show that in both cases, with or without commitments, apology works only if it is sincere, i.e. costly enough. Most interestingly, our model predicts that individuals tend to use much costlier apology in committed relationships than otherwise, because it helps better identify free-riders such as fake committers: "commitments bring about sincerity'. Furthermore, we show that this strategy of apology supported by commitments outperforms the famous existent strategies of the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.