Journal of Cryptology
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
A Refined Power-Analysis Attack on Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
PKC '03 Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
Resistance against Differential Power Analysis for Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Preventing SPA/DPA in ECC Systems Using the Jacobi Form
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Hessian Elliptic Curves and Side-Channel Attacks
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Protections against Differential Analysis for Elliptic Curve Cryptography
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
The Hessian Form of an Elliptic Curve
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Montgomery Ladder for All Genus 2 Curves in Characteristic 2
WAIFI '08 Proceedings of the 2nd international workshop on Arithmetic of Finite Fields
The arithmetic of characteristic 2 Kummer surfaces and of elliptic Kummer lines
Finite Fields and Their Applications
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The Zero-Value Point (ZVP) attack, one of side channel attacks, is very powerful to recover the secret information of elliptic curve cyrptosystem (ECC) on memory constraint devices by monitoring their power consumptions. In the ZVP attack, the zero-value registers are used in point addition and doubling formula of ECC to resist randomizations. Hence, the countermeasures against the differential power analysis (DPA), like Coron's and Joye-Tymen's randomization, do not work for the ZVP attack. The Kummer surface is a variety associated to the Jacobian of a genus 2 curve with a map. The pseudo-group structure on the Kummer surface defines a scalar multiplication, which is more efficient than that in HECC and comparable to ECC, especially in constraint environments. We inspect the pseudo-addition and doubling formula of the Kummer surface and show how to find zero-value registers. Our analysis shows that the scalar multiplication on the Kummer surface suffers from the ZVP attack, hence all Kummer-based cryptosystems are inevitable to the ZVP attack.