Security analysis and comparison of the SHA-3 finalists BLAKE, grøstl, JH, keccak, and skein

  • Authors:
  • Elena Andreeva;Bart Mennink;Bart Preneel;Marjan Škrobot

  • Affiliations:
  • Dept. Electrical Engineering, ESAT/COSIC and IBBT, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium;Dept. Electrical Engineering, ESAT/COSIC and IBBT, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium;Dept. Electrical Engineering, ESAT/COSIC and IBBT, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium;Dept. Electrical Engineering, ESAT/COSIC and IBBT, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium

  • Venue:
  • AFRICACRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Cryptology in Africa
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

In 2007, the US National Institute for Standards and Technology announced a call for the design of a new cryptographic hash algorithm in response to the vulnerabilities identified in widely employed hash functions, such as MD5 and $\mathrm{SHA\text{-}1}$. NIST received many submissions, 51 of which got accepted to the first round. At present, 5 candidates are left in the third round of the competition. At NIST's second SHA-3 Candidate Conference 2010, Andreeva et al. provided a provable security classification of the second round SHA-3 candidates in the ideal model. In this work, we revisit this classification for the five SHA-3 finalists. We evaluate recent provable security results on the candidates, and resolve remaining open problems for Grøstl, JH, and Skein.