Stable Internet routing without global coordination
Proceedings of the 2000 ACM SIGMETRICS international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
The stable paths problem and interdomain routing
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
How secure are secure interdomain routing protocols
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2010 conference
Putting BGP on the right path: a case for next-hop routing
Hotnets-IX Proceedings of the 9th ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks
Weakly-acyclic (internet) routing games
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Secure Border Gateway Protocol (S-BGP)
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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Harmful Internet hijacking incidents put in evidence how fragile the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is, which is used to exchange routing information between Autonomous Systems (ASes). As proved by recent research contributions, even S-BGP, the secure variant of BGP that is being deployed, is not fully able to blunt traffic attraction attacks. Given a traffic flow between two ASes, we study how difficult it is for a malicious AS to devise a strategy for hijacking or intercepting that flow. We show that this problem marks a sharp difference between BGP and S-BGP. Namely, while it is solvable, under reasonable assumptions, in polynomial time for the type of attacks that are usually performed in BGP, it is NP-hard for S-BGP. Our study has several by-products. E.g., we solve a problem left open in the literature, stating when performing a hijacking in S-BGP is equivalent to performing an interception.