The British Nationality Act as a logic program
Communications of the ACM
The Pleadings Game: an exercise in computational dialectics
Artificial Intelligence and Law
Hart's critics on defeasible concepts and ascriptivism
ICAIL '95 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Artificial intelligence and law
Hard cases: a procedural approach
Artificial Intelligence and Law
The Zeno argumentation framework
Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Artificial intelligence and law
Logical tools for legal argument: a practical assessment in the domain of tort
Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Artificial intelligence and law
Modelling reasoning about evidence in legal procedure
Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Artificial intelligence and law
Pleadings Game: An Artificial Intelligence Model of Procedural Justice
Pleadings Game: An Artificial Intelligence Model of Procedural Justice
On Dialogue Systems with Speech Acts, Arguments, and Counterarguments
JELIA '00 Proceedings of the European Workshop on Logics in Artificial Intelligence
Logical Tools for Modelling Legal Argument: A Study of Defeasible Reasoning in Law
Logical Tools for Modelling Legal Argument: A Study of Defeasible Reasoning in Law
Modelling reasoning about evidence in legal procedure
Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Artificial intelligence and law
Formalising arguments about the burden of persuasion
Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Artificial intelligence and law
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This paper investigates whether current nonmonotonic logics are suitable for formalising the defeasibility of legal reasoning. It does so by studying the role of burden of proof in legal argument, in particular how allocations of burden of proof determine the required strength of counterarguments. It is argued that the two currently available modelling approaches both have some shortcomings. On the one hand, techniques for modelling burden of proof in nonmonotonic logics do not allow for shifts of the burden of proof from one party to the other. On the other hand, current procedural models of legal argument are too rigid, in that every counterargument induces a shift of proof burdens; this fails to respect that in legal reasoning burden shifts only occur in some cases. It is then shown how current dialectical models of defeasible reasoning can be adapted to overcome these shortcomings.